'The philosopher Bruno Latour referred to the debate [between einstein and Bergson] as a locus classicus for thinking about the relation between science and other areas of culture:

There is no better way to frame this question than the bungled dialog (well, not really a “dialogue,” but that’s the point) between Henri Bergson and Albert Einstein in Paris in 1922. Bergson had carefully studied Einstein’s theory of relativity and wrote a thick book about it, but Einstein had only a few dismissive comments about Bergson’s argument. After Bergson spoke for thirty minutes, Einstein made a terse two-minute remark, ending with this damning sentence: “Hence there is no philosopher’s time; there is only a psychological time different from the time of the physicist. [note: 'Latour, "Some Experiments in Art and Politics." For Latour's first solid engagement with Einstein and the theory of relativity see Bruno Latour, "A Reltivistic Account of Einstein's Relativity," Social Studies of Science 18, no, 1 (1988):5.']

"Matters of concern" faced off against "matters of fact" by direct reference to Bergson and Einstein. These, like many other binary categories, have become ingrained examples of our pertinent cultural divides, [note: 'Bruno Latour, "Why Has Critique Run Out of Steam? From Maters of Fact to Matters of Concern," Critical Inquiry 30, no. 2 (2004).'] "Can we do better at the beginning of the twenty-first century?" he asked.

A few years before the twenty-first century came to a close, Latour studied Bergson's concept of time, calling Bergson's argument "the most unfair account of science." Although he distanced himself from Bergson's critique, similarities between Bergson and Latour were readily apparent. "The crux of Bergson's argument is not really different from that of Latour," explained the sociologist Michel Callon. [note: 'Callon, "Whose Imposture?," 276.'] Latour explained how Bergson's positio nwas often dismised because it was framed as one concerned exclusively with subjectivity: "Einstein argued that there was only one space and time - that of physics - and that what Bergson was after was nothing more than subjective time - that of psychology." [note: 'Latour, "Some Experiments in Art and Politics," 5.'] According to Latour, Einstein's manner of dealing with Bergson became a typical way for scientisits to deal with nonscience, including philosophy, politics, and art. While Bergson's account of Einstein's science had been "unfair," Einstein's account of philosophy was also tendentious: "We recognize here the classical way for scientists to deal with philoosphy, politics, and art: 'What you say might be nice and interestingbut it has no cosmological relevance because it only deals with subjective elements, the lived world, not the real world.

Latour's project consisted in asking "is it possible to give Bergson another chance to make his case that, no, he is not talking about subjective time and space, but is rather proposing an alternative to Einstein’s cosmology?" [note: 'Ibid.'] But how? One could start by adopting a different metaphysical conception of time, concluding, with Latour, that it is not "coherent and homogeneous." [note: 'Latour, "We Have Never Been Modern," 134']' (356-357)